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The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolishes the common law partial defence of 
provocation and in its place introduces a new partial defence to murder of loss of control,1 
which can be attributed to fear as well as anger. This is the government's response to the 
Law Commission's 20062 Report which recommended not only reshaping the partial 
defences to murder, but also reforming the law of homicide as a whole. Regarded as the 
first step to reform in this area, this comment considers whether it is a step we needed to 
take. 
 The problem with provocation 
Provocation has always had its place in English law as the recognition of human frailty, as 
passion aroused in the provoked killer takes away his ability to reason. It has a vast 
common law background of change and interpretation, and the defence as presented in the 
modern-day courtroom still shows aspects that appear outdated. Holten and Shute noted 
that the defence contains features ‘not applicable to modern times’.3 It has always been 
the subject of criticism and proposals for reform, either as regards the oxymoronic 
objective standard of reasonableness or as to whether cumulative provocation should be 
accepted to make the defence more accessible for women who have suffered domestic 
violence. It is therefore unsurprising that the Law Commission has focused on this topic in 
recent years,4 suggesting some radical changes not only to defences to murder, but also to 
the structure of homicide itself. Indeed, most criminal law commentators have queried as 
to how much longer the law on provocation will need to be stretched to include worthy 
cases before it is finally realised that the defence needs to be cut from new cloth. 
A Consultation Paper published in July 2008 recommended a new partial defence to murder 
with two limbs to replace provocation, still based on a loss of self-control with an objective 
measure, but recognising *J. Crim. L. 119  that a defence is needed for situations not 
only arising from anger but also a fear of harm.5 This is an opinion found in many recent 
academic commentaries, in particular Horder, who recognises that both fear and anger can 
 equally undermine self-control.6 Wells has also noted that as battered women do not fit 
well with both the defence of provocation and the rules of diminished responsibility, a new 
defence may be in order.7 The subsequent Coroners and Justice Bill enjoyed Parliament's 
attention throughout 2009,8 and generated much support, the strongest being from 
groups supporting domestic abuse victims. 
 The need for acknowledging human frailty 
Why do we protect those who have acted due to a loss of self-control? And how do we 
distinguish what incidents of loss of self-control establish a potential defence to murder? 
Dressler9 gives the sound explanation that we partially excuse those who had the capacity 
to control themselves, but lacked fair opportunity to do so. Traditionally, we have 
attributed the loss of self-control to a state of indignation or anger, quite possibly because 
these emotions spurn external signs of loss of self-control which are easily detectable, 
whereas emotions such as fear do not.10 Holten and Shute11 have given some guidelines 
on what evidence might be apparent of a loss of self-control in a situation arising from fear 
rather than anger; mainly that the agent acts without having any concern for his long-term 
welfare, for example, giving no consideration to the fact that he might be caught and 
imprisoned. Holten and Shute also point out that a person might appear to be acting 
rationally, for example, by sharpening a knife or loading a gun, but this is merely to ensure 
he succeeds in his task, and this differs from an agent who puts on gloves to prevent finger 
prints on the murder weapon. It is only the latter that shows steps of premeditation, and 
the two must be distinguished, as the defence of loss of self-control is allowed only to set 
apart such killings from those which are calculated or arising from revenge.12 
There are various aspects to the previous law on provocation which have often attracted 
academic commentary and criticism, many of *J. Crim. L. 120  which will be remedied by 
the new law. Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 required the judge to leave the issue of 
provocation to the jury even if the objective element was not met: 
Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person 
charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to 
lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a 
reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury … 
Therefore, if evidence is presented during the trial that there was provocative conduct and 
a loss of self-control, the jury should be directed on this even if it would be absurd to say 
that they would find a reasonable person would have acted as the defendant did. A duty 
was even imposed on counsel on both sides to make the judge aware that evidence of 
provocation was present.13 The judge may have been certain that no reasonable jury 
would return a manslaughter verdict on grounds of provocation, but should the 
requirements of the subjective element be met the issue of whether to direct the jury on 
this was no longer at his discretion.14 The jury were to be given the opportunity to decide 
on the objective element. What kind of evidence was sufficient to give rise to the duty of 
the judge to leave provocation to the jury? Russell LJ commented in R v Rossiter :15 
We take the law to be that wherever there is material which is capable of amounting to 
provocation, however tenuous it may be, the jury must be given the privilege of ruling on 
 it. 
The Law Commission proposed that this duty be removed unless the judge considers there 
to be evidence on which the jury may accept the plea, thus empowering the judge to 
withdraw the defence if his belief is to the contrary. This proposal was incorporated into the 
Coroners and Justice Act. No longer will the jury be asked to consider the defence of 
provocation based on a ‘speculative possibility’ that there had been some conduct 
amounting to provocation.16 The logic of this is that the judge is better equipped to 
speculate on these matters, but will this lead to opening the floodgates for appeals on 
misdirection? 
Before the 1957 Act the judge had been entitled to withdraw provocation if his thoughts 
were that a reasonable man would not have acted as the defendant did. It seems as though 
the government have taken a step back rather than forward in developing the law in this 
area, by reverting the law back to its original state before it was altered by the 1957 Act.17 
This has been a current theme with provocation. For *J. Crim. L. 121  example, in 2005, 
the judgment in R v Holley18 succeeded in quashing developments of case law over the 
previous decade with regard to characteristics attributed to the reasonable man, reverting 
the law to a fixed capacity for self-control and not a variable standard as had previously 
been applied following the decision in R v Smith (Morgan).19 The decision in Holley 
reinstated a defence which was limited to the literal words of the Homicide Act 1957,20 
giving no scope for interpretation. It also appeared that Holley had yet again put battered 
women outside the jurisdiction of the provocation defence, but given those defendants who 
possessed a quick temper a ready excuse as long as they could claim some manner of 
wrongdoing or felt injustice. These seemingly unjust results had made the law even more 
desperate for reform. 
 Solving the problem 
Many had recommended change in this vague and outdated area of the law, and it was 
even speculated that the Law Commission might have recommended abolishing 
provocation altogether in its 2006 Report had it been given the scope to reflect on the 
mandatory life sentence.21 In fact, Ormerod has suggested that the very purpose of 
provocation's existence at all might have been to ‘unshackle the judge from imposing the 
mandatory sentence’.22 In the responses to the Consultation Paper, it was noted that 
some academics had concurred that the problem with the law is not the partial defences to 
murder, but the mandatory life sentence, and abolishing this would be a much simpler 
route.23 
As mentioned earlier, the government has chosen to provide a remedy by reforming 
defences to murder rather than homicide as a whole, which was recommended by the Law 
Commission. The Commission suggested a new three-tier structure similar to that adopted 
in the USA, and the failure to take on board this radical overhaul by the government was 
deemed by Dennis ‘a sad fate for a good proposal’.24 Indeed, it was noted during the 
debate on the Coroners and Justice Bill that it was a disappointment not to see a full reform 
to the law on homicide.25 
This lacklustre attitude which meant shying away from the full reform of homicide is not the 
 only criticism of the new law. While some responses to the Consultation Paper accused the 
government of pandering to pressure groups, others have been more critical of the sexual 
infidelity exclusion built into the new defence,26 including Lord Phillips, *J. Crim. L. 
122  who is quoted saying he felt ‘uneasy’ about this exclusion.27 The new law is also 
without any provision demanding evidence of seeking help from the authorities prior to the 
killing, and the absence of such a requirement is deemed problematic, as it allows the 
defence to be raised without any real evidence that the person killing from fear of serious 
harm had no other option. Leigh voices such concerns,28 and this was also noted in the 
responses to the consultation,29 where there was apprehension that the defence could be 
open to abuse without such a requirement. However, it could be said that previous 
unsuccessful attempts to seek help from authorities could do nothing but put defendants in 
a favourable light, as it would show that they tried other avenues to safeguard themselves 
and were left in a position where they lacked no choice but to carry out their own attempt 
at self-preservation. Therefore leaving this requirement out of the equation when 
determining the constraints of the new defence seems less than troubling. There is also the 
notion put forward by many domestic violence help groups, and also noted by Wells,30 that 
often the assertion that women have such opportunity as to leave an abusive relationship 
or call the police is untrue. 
 Out with the old, in with the new 
Section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 states: 
Partial defence to murder: loss of control 
54-- (1) Where a person (‘D’) kills or is a party to the killing of another (‘V’), D is not to be 
convicted of murder if-- 
(a) D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D's loss of 
self-control, 
(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and 
(c) a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in 
the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of 
control was sudden. 
(3) In subsection (1)(c) the reference to ‘the circumstances of D’ is a reference to all of D's 
circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D's conduct is that they bear on 
D's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. 
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a 
considered desire for revenge. 
(5) On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect 
to the defence under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the defence is satisfied 
unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
*J. Crim. L. 123  (6) For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to
 raise an issue with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of 
the trial judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might 
apply. 
(7) A person who, but for this section, would be liable to be convicted of murder is liable 
instead to be convicted of manslaughter. 
(8) The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted 
of murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted to murder in the case 
of any other party to it.31 
A first glance at these provisions gives the impression of a defence which tries to make 
good from the precedents established over the past 20 years, whilst continuing with the 
essence of the defence of provocation--loss of self-control and an acknowledgement of 
human frailty. The new defence of loss of control appears to be an extension of the 
common law defence of provocation (which is abolished under s. 56 of the 2009 Act), 
including all the relevant milestones made in the courtroom. The scope of the provocative 
act remains much the same, with things done, things said, or a combination of these being 
accepted as capable of amounting to provocation by the deceased.32 However, the 
objective and subjective elements are enhanced and shaped into a much more detailed and 
precise ruling of when the defence should succeed and when it should fail. 
 Losing the ‘sudden’ requirement 
Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 required the defendant to have experienced a loss of 
self-control. It did not state that this must be sudden, but this was considered to be good 
law following the decision in R v Duffy.33 The 2009 Act has removed the need for the loss 
of self-control to be sudden, which is a welcome development. Section 3 of the 1957 Act did 
not provide what the loss of self-control should be attributed to. However, it appears that 
loss of self-control is and has been most easily associated with the emotion of anger, when 
someone simply ‘snaps’. This has certainly been conveyed in the courtroom, and this has 
made it very difficult for anyone acting from any other emotion to show evidence that his 
actions were due to losing self-control. Under the 2009 Act the loss of self-control must be 
due to at least one of two ‘qualifying’ triggers in order for the defence to succeed. The loss 
of self-control must be attributed to a fear of serious violence (s. 55(3)) or circumstances 
of extremely grave character which cause a justifiable sense of being wronged (s. 55(4)(a) 
and (b)).34 The problem one might foresee with these provisions is that they group 
together a defence attributed to fear with a defence in which the defendant has likely acted 
out of anger. Nevertheless, the fact that the law now recognises that emotions other than 
anger can amount to a loss of self-control can be regarded as a step *J. Crim. L. 124  in 
the right direction, particularly for battered women who kill their abusers. 
 Loss of self-control and the reasonable man 
Possibly the most intriguing elements to the new Act are those surrounding the objective 
element. Again, the Homicide Act 1957 requires only taking into account everything done 
or said to the effect which it would have on a reasonable man. This is very vague and is 
 therefore the reason why judges have found it difficult to portray this ‘reasonable man’ to 
the jury. In the case of DPP v Camplin,35 the trial judge referred to the reasonable person 
as being ‘like an elephant’, in that he is hard to describe but easy to recognise. An 
interesting analogy, but one which is unhelpful to a jury wondering whether this fictional 
person should be the same age, sex, race or other characteristic as the defendant. The 
cases where this issue has been specifically dealt with are stacked high and inconsistent. 
Camplin attributed the defendant's age and sex to the reasonable person, whilst Smith 
(Morgan)36 allowed characteristics personal to the defendant to be taken into account, not 
only in affecting the gravity of the provocation but also in assessing his capacity for 
self-control. This was then overruled by Holley,37 albeit only a Privy Council decision, but 
considered good law, where it was decided that the capacity for self-control should be fixed 
and not variable; therefore such characteristics could only be taken into account when 
considering the gravity of provocation. 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 seeks to remedy this by giving a much more coherent 
explanation as to the reasonable person. Section 54(1)(c) refers to a person of the 
defendant's sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint who, in the 
same circumstances as the defendant found himself in, might have acted in the same way 
or a similar way. Section 54(3) allows the jury to consider all circumstances except those 
whose only relevance to the defendant's conduct is that they have a bearing on his general 
capacity for tolerance and self-constraint. Note the use of the word ‘circumstances’ in place 
of the previously used term ‘characteristic’. This change in wording should be welcomed, 
particularly with regard to battered women who kill, as it is a move away from making such 
women seem as though they have a mental illness. ‘Circumstances’ suggests being able to 
consider prior abuse as an external element rather than having to try and deem it as a 
characteristic by internalising it as some kind of syndrome or character flaw. 
*J. Crim. L. 125  The way forward
As the new ‘qualifying triggers’ to loss of self-control are yet to be put to the test, the best 
way to establish if the 2009 Act will lead to justice in considering human imperfection may 
be to consider it in the light of previous leading cases. Consider DPP v Camplin,38 where a 
boy of 15 was sexually assaulted and then taunted by his attacker. He killed his attacker by 
hitting him over the head with a heavy pan. Were the circumstances of extremely grave 
character, causing him to have a justifiable sense of being wronged? If so, his loss of 
self-control would be measured against that of a reasonable boy aged 15, and it is arguable 
whether a jury would likely accept that all elements to the new defence are met. The 
problem area with the trigger in s. 55(4)(a) is the meaning of the term ‘extremely grave 
character’. The meaning of this term may differ depending on the life experience and 
culture of the defendant. With no guidelines included in the law to clarify which situations 
this might cover, how will the judge adequately direct the jury? The 2009 Act does not 
require consideration of religion and culture in determining what a reasonable person 
might do in the situation, and it is questionable whether these things could be considered 
under the term ‘all other circumstances’, as they are regarded more as personal attributes 
or characteristics. It may be that we are some way from clarification on how closely related 
‘characteristics’ and ‘circumstances’ are. 
 As regards the fear of serious violence trigger (s. 55(3)), what would happen if the case of 
Duffy, a young woman frequently battered by the victim, were to be tried again today? 
With the suddenness element removed, opening up the possibility of cumulative 
provocation being considered, what would the decision be? Would it be that she lost her 
self-control due to a fear of serious violence, and a woman of similar age who had 
previously experienced many occasions of violence at the hands of the victim, might have 
acted the same way? It is submitted that under the new provisions the court would come to 
the latter conclusion, and the defendant would be convicted of manslaughter. This is not 
because the previous incidents had affected her capacity for self-restraint, as would negate 
such circumstances from being considered, but because she had the knowledge that the 
victim would act upon threats made and likely repeat his violent behaviour. There would 
almost certainly be the same outcome for the case of R v Ahluwalia,39 a woman who killed 
her husband after years of physical and psychological abuse. Would any of these women 
meet the criteria for both qualifying triggers? It will be interesting to see if any kind of 
prolonged abuse--be it sexual, physical or emotional--will be deemed by the courts as 
circumstances of a grave character causing a justifiable sense of being wronged (s. 
55(4)(b)). 
The government's attempt to resolve the infamous provocation problem is a welcome 
change, but some areas are still without solution. There is now an outline of which 
emotions may trigger a loss of *J. Crim. L. 126  self-control, but other dilemmas remain. 
What is a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint? In fact, a better question to ask 
might be: is there a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint? The ‘extremely grave 
character’ term will prove the most troublesome, causing no end of debate and nuisance 
for the courts in deciding what situations this might cover. The quandary of how 
competently the problem has been solved does not attach only to the wording of the Act, 
but the concept as a whole in light of a law which may prove more beneficial to women 
(with the acknowledgement of fear as a trigger), but possibly to the disadvantage of men 
(by the express exclusion of sexual infidelity). As we observe how case law develops in this 
area following the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, will we see more just results, or has the 
law gone from being biased for one gender to another? To coin a very clichéd phrase, only 
time will tell. 
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